On Windows endpoints, the SecureConnector agent is vulnerable to privilege escalation whereby an authenticated unprivileged user can obtain administrator privileges on the endpoint because files are created in a folder with incorrect privileges

On Windows endpoints, the SecureConnector agent must run under the local SYSTEM account or another administrator account in order to enable full functionality of the agent. The typical configuration is for the agent to run as a Windows service under the local SYSTEM account. The SecureConnector agent runs various plugin scripts and executables on the endpoint in order to gather and report information about the host to the CounterACT management appliance. The SecureConnector agent downloads these scripts and executables as needed from the CounterACT management appliance and runs them on the endpoint. By default, these executable files are downloaded to and run from the %TEMP% directory of the currently logged on user, despite the fact that the SecureConnector agent is running as SYSTEM. Aside from the downloaded scripts, the SecureConnector agent runs a batch file with SYSTEM privileges from the temp directory of the currently logged on user. If the naming convention of this script can be derived, which is made possible by placing it in a directory to which the user has read access, it may be possible overwrite the legitimate batch file with a malicious one before SecureConnector executes it. It is possible to change this directory by setting the the configuration property config.script_run_folder.value in the local.properties configuration file on the CounterACT management appliance, however the batch file which is run does not follow this property.

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在具有不安全权限的目录中创建临时文件

ForeScout CounterACT 权限许可和访问控制漏洞

ForeScout CounterACT是一款网络准入控制产品。 ForeScout CounterACT中存在安全漏洞，该漏洞源于程序以不安全的方式创建文件。攻击者可借助恶意的文件利用该漏洞覆盖合法的批处理文件并可能更改路径。

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权限许可和访问控制问题